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PREFACE
This past year the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel has focused
its attention on the Space Shuttle system, and has augmented its
traditional on-site inspection approach with the assignment of task
teams for more detailc4 fact-finding in specific areas of concern.
This two-fold approach has enabled the Panel to cover a large number
of tasks in greater depth while continuing to monitor the statue of
the program as a whole.
The Panel cannot, of course, review all activities of the pro-
gram in equal detail. The folloioing sections, which reflect the
priorities the Panel felt were most deserving of its attention, were
chosen on the basis of the importance of those elements, subsystems
and management systems with respect to crew safety and mission success.
Each section was written by a different team. The Panel recognizes a
continuing responsibility for surveilance of Shuttle and will continue
to submit appropriate reports when each phese of its review is completed.
Following is a statement of our general corclusions. These con-
clusions also serve as an introduction to the task team reports.
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1.0 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
This abstract is a prologue to the task team reports which follow
this section. It begins with a general assessment of the program and
then identifies those topics the Panel suggests be reviewed by various
levels of NASA management as part of their continuing oversight of
program operations.
I. The Panel is confident, based on the data we have gathered,
that the Shuttle organization is developing flightworthy hardware and
software systems. Program management has an adequate understanding
of the significant ground and flight risks involved. This general
statement is based on such observations as the following:
A.	 PROGRAM STATUS
The program is progressing as well as can be expected con-
sidering budget constraints. The majority of subsystems are proceed-
ing through design, manufacturing and test as planned. However,
there is no margin in the schedule to accommodate major perturba-
tions. As in any research and development program, some subsystems
are encountering problems. This situation is not unusual where new
technology is applied in new situations. Problems are being aggress-
ively worked by management and engineering. The Shuttle Main Engine
and Orbiter Thermal Protection Systems are notable examples.
B. TECHNICAL CONSCIENCE
Program personnel have maintained their enthusiasm for
raising questions of significance to the performance and safety of
the Shuttle. There are adequate forums for them to express their
concerns and judgments to management. The personnel in critical
positions for decisions affecting flightworthiness and risk assess-
ment are competent and experienced.
C. RISK MANAGEMENT
There is an independent and mature risk management system
which considers all aspects of safety. The system also assures that
design, manufacturing and test experience from prior programs is
formally brought to the attention of people in this program and is
being applied appropriately.
D. AGGREGATE RISK
Aggregate or total risk is difficult to measure. Nothing
to date indicates the total risk is excessive at this phase of the
program. The major basis for confidence in the flight hardware and
software is the Shuttle verification program, since such a program
certifies that the performance of the actual flight hardware and
software meets mission requirements. Therefore, these tests are
especially important, and their results will give a better under-
standing of the actual capability and limitations of the Shuttle elements.
II. The Panel suggests that senior agency management include
the following areas in their reviews of policy and planning for in-
formation and control as warranted.
A. GROUND TEST PROGRAM
The verification and certification programs and the de-
cision making system to establish minimum test requirements to cer-
tify flightworthiness and safety warrant continued attention.
Our reasoning is as follows. There is little schedule
margin, funds or extra test hardware in any of the major test pro-
grams. If test results do not turn out as expected, management will
need to reassess its requirements for certification of the fli,ghtworthi-
ness of the elements, adjust the schedule, or accept greater risks.
Decisions on what are minimum requirements are matters of judgment.
Such judgments are properly a prerogative and responsibility of pro-
gram and project management.
To assure that these judgments continue to be made with
safety as the top priority, senior management will need to monitor:
1. The ability to meet minimum requirements where there
are further reductions or changes in the major test program.
2. Progress in resolving problems in such critical manu-
facturing and test areas as the Main Engine nozzle and turbo-machinery,
and the delivery and independent verification of avionics software.
i
5
I3.	 The realism of plans and schedules for the remaining
tests where there are significant problems so that decisions can be
made early rather than undt r schedule pressure.
B.	 THE APPROACH AND LANDING TEST FLIGHTS (ALT)
Mission planning and vehicle checkout for the flight pro-
gram have begun and will peak out this coming fiscal year.
The areas that warrant review now are;
1. The data required from ALT to support a flight readi-
ness decision on the first orbital flights and therefore the current
policy on mission planning to obtain this data.
2. The aggregate risk inherent in the "first flight" plan
to assure it remains at an acceptable level. The ALT safety assess-
ment document appears to be a good starting point for such a review.
3. The basis for confidence that the structural capability
of the 747 tail section will not be overloaded during tailcone off
flights and that vibrations will not exceed crew tolerance.
4. The test requirements and plans to give confidence
that the landing gear will deploy and lock as required.
5. The plan to have adequate Ground Support Equipment at
the proper place to support the ALT program.
6. The flight software requirements so there is an identical
flight profile for autoland and manual modes.
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7.	 The provision to allow the crew to adjust the gain of
the control system.
III. The Panel suggests that the Office of Space Flight give
particular attention in its reviews to the following management areas.
A. AVIONICS
The effectiveness of recent changes in the avionics manage-
ment approach and the need for a software expert in the Technical
Assessment Office as an independent advisor and check and balance.
Among the challenges they face are potential overloading of software,
timeliness of deliveries, and the adequacy of independent verification.
Independent verification of software in flight configuration is con-
sidered to be very important. Fixes in hardware need to be assessed
for their impact on software. Potential rearrangement of core memory
by lightning or static discharges must be assessed.
B. SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT FOR CONTINGENCY ABORT PLANNING
The management system to assure that contingency abort
—aalyses are given the proper priority now so that changes, partic-
ularly in the software, are being made while there is still the cap-
ability for changes.
C. SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER
The total or integrated management plan to assure SRB
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reliability by appropriate controls during design, manufacturing,
checkout, recovery and reuse. There are currently plans for the
various phases but since we are dependent on the extremely high
degree of reliability of the SRB there has to be both an overall
plan and an appropriate management system to assure nothing is over-
looked or "falls through the crack."
IV. The Panel recommends that program management follow closely
the following specifi^ tech aical issues as well as the policy, planning,
and management areas 4nentioned above.
A. EXTERNAL TANK
The selection of a material and its method of application
for the external insulation, so that the program gets the flight
performance it needs.
B. SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER
The safeguards to protect the auxilliary power unit from
sea water entering the catalytic bed of the fuel system after splash-
down.
C. ORBITER THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM
1.	 The provisions to assure that installation procedures
and tools will maintain the required gap and step between tiles and
8
so avoid the problem of an early tripping of the boundary layer.
2. The provisions to adequately protect vehicle openings
during entry with insulation, while assuring this insulation will
not obstruct the operation of doors.
3. The data from further aerodynamic, and flight tests
be utilized to insure selection of proper materials.
The following Task Team Reports contain the details on all of
these recommendations as well as additional recommendations not
listed here.
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2.0 SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT
Hon. Willis M. Hawkins
Mr. Herbert E. Grier
Hon. Frank C. Di Luzio
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2.0 SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT
I. BACKGROUND
In recognition of the complexity of the Shuttle system and the
need to have many back-up and fail safe or redundant systems to attain
a high degree of safety, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel has en-
deavored to understand NASA's approach to systems management and to
assess the success of these efforts. During the last year the Panel
has had numerous briefings from major element and systevis integration
managers at NASA Centers and from contractors. The Panel also reviewed
the management system for contingency and abort planning. Finally,
the Panel reviewed the NASA Program Office's response to earlier re-
commendations from the Panel and from the Hawkins Committee,.
II. OBSERVATIONS
The systems management function exercises oversight of the re-
quirements for the total flight vehicle and integrates the work on
the major elements toward meeting these requirements. Thus, "systems
management" includes both systems integration and the independent
assessment of the various elements in the program.
The Panel found that earlier models were not used by the Shuttle
tram because of such factors as complexity, re-usability of major
components, limited bLck-up resources and NASA'S management experience.
The system management approach is still evolving because it is de-
signed to be responsive to changing needs. Thus the Panel has had
13
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to understand and appreciate Cite differences in approach before judg-
ing its cffecti=09s. In order Lo know what Lo expecL in terms of
performance, the Panel focused on the structure and operation of Lhe
manngomenL system and on the circumstances that will continue. Lo
shape and constrain its evolution. in the recent paSL the relative
responsibilities of the program office and the principal systems con-
tractors have been renegotiated so the program office I1: 18 Laken more
direct responsibility for the definition and implomentaLion of the
requirements for systems integration. Since Lhe Systems lategraLion
office at JSC remains comparatively small, it has developed a "umber
of mechanisms for get L ing its \f'ol'k done. One of the most imporLa"L
IS No comparatively compleX systrn ► of fI lLy panels and working;
groups. These, where needed, are chartered by the Systems We-
gration Office through Lhe Program Wager when more than one ptojecL
element is involved or an inter-disciplinary Lechnical approach is re-
quired to dc.'I.ine requirements and assure they are Met. They are staf ted
by the samo personnel who are involved at the pro3ect level in getting;
Lhe work done. This approach has the advantage of assuring that the
people who work the systems intograLion problems are familiar with the
working details, but I t also means that Were is a need for an We-
pendent assessment function as a check and balance on this approach.
This was recommended by both the Panel anti the Hawkins Committer. The
14
Program Manager instituted such a function this past year.
A. SYSTEMS INTEGRATION
Our current observations on systems integration can be sum-
marized as follows:
1. The management structure for systems integration is cum-
bersome but comprehensive and appears to work.
2. We have been asked to review the system for technical
conscience and we have found that the panels and working groups are
an important element of it. These provide a forum for knowledgeable
technical personnel to alert management to :questions considered im-
portant for crew safety and mission. success.
3. The staff of engineers in the systems engineering office
may need to be increased. As noted, systems integration is being
done by project engineers under the oversight of the systems engi-
neering office. Because of the workload and the possible difference
in perspective between the two disciplines, management regularly
should review the staffing of the systems engineering office to assure
that its capability is appropriate for its responsibilities.
4. In terms of documentation it appears that most of the
directives which describe the system have to do with responsibilities
for monitoring and evaluating Shuttle progress rather than with
specifying how the daily work gets done or how the daily integration
15
decisions are made. Furthei , ;,,e, a of the directives do not clearly
define or describe responsibii.iLxcs. Using SSPM Directive No. 45A
as an example, it is not clear how the Systems Integration Manager
works with the Systems Engineering Office, nor which instructs the
"doer" organizations.
5. The Program Office also has been working on a systems
engineering plan to assure that delivered vehicles meet the total re-
quirements for flightworthiness and to specify the relative roles and
responsibilities of the organisations involved in meeting these re-
quirements. Such a plan helps insure both an efficient organisation
and that significant requirements are not lost sight of. Work on
this plan has been delayed further. If the plan is not to be avail
able in a timely fashion then management will have to assure that the
basic need that required such a document is met in another way.
G. The Panel and the Hawkins Committee have emphasized the
need for program management to continue to review the panels and work-
ing groups, to assure that the system Anticipates emerging program
needs and does not lag them, and that individual groups are operating
effectively. This year program management partially responded to this
recommendation with a review which resulted in consolidation of some
panels to reflect changing work requirements and the chartering of new
ones for recently identified needs.
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7. In monitoring such areas as integration of the main
propulsion system, the Panel reviews the work of the groups involved.
In one such review the Panel found that the newly established Chief
Engineer at MSFC For the Main Propulsion System was not a member of
the integration panel (e.g., Systems Integration Review Panel) activ-
ities at JSC. The Panel believes that he should have direct partici-
pation and membership in the Systems Integration Review Panel activ-
ities, as well as be a part of the approval cycle for Level TT
and III documents pertaining to his area of responsibility.
The Panel has not yet completed consideration of other
important system integration issues such as configuration management,
interface control and interaction between Shuttle system elements.
B. INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT
The Panel also has reviewsd the evolution of the independent
assessment groups, giving particular attention to the evolution of
the group at JSC. This group became operational at the first of the
year and began detailed discussions with each of the critical sub-
system managers. Based on these discussions, and their past expericuce,
the group identified the areas where they would make detailed studies.
The results of these studies were to be provided management in Forms
that appeared appropriate to the situation. In some cases the judg-
ments were offered as informal advice to managers and engineers. In
17
other cases, the studies were written for senior program and center
management's consideration. It is too early to assess how these
groups will evolve or their effect on the program. Our thoughts
at this time are;
1.	 Th,a technical assessment groups either can focus on
identifying problems for program resolution or can take on the role
of trouble shooter and work the resolution of the problem. Both
roles are acceptable. However, the Panel favors the role of identi-
fying problems so the assessment groups can cover more areas of the
program.
:'.	 Studies of the program assessment group at SC indicate
the value of such groups. For instance, they have made significant
studies in such areas as contingency abort planning and possible
Orbiter failure that would shut down the Main Engine.
	 Given the po-
tential workload for these groups, one of their real problems will
be the establishment of priorities. The Panel suggests that priority
be given to safety issues rather than non-safety issues that may
seem more pressing.
C.	 ABORT AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING
The Panel reviewed abort and contingency planning from the
perspective of system management because there needs to be a clearly
identifiable system dedicated to this area. This would include the
18
integration of hazard assessments for various elements, so that the
vulnerability of one =lement to the hazards of another is understood.
Where. practical the margin of safety should be enhanced, but whether
the margin is sufficient is, of course, .i matter of management judgment.
The Panel seeks to assure that the pertinent facts are re-
viewed at the right levels prior to such decisions. For example, the
program carefully considered how the Orbiter could be protected against
Shuttle system failures during; the Solid Rocket Booster burn period.
Both the abort systems that could be used in the advent of an SRI;
failure and exp .rience with reliability of solid racket systems were
reviewed. The conclusion was to depend upon quality control on the
SRB rather than an abort system with its complexity and potential
failure modes. Also, ejection seats will be used during the early
test flights to enhance crew escape in case of aborts. Emphasis is
on intact abort planning rather than contingency abort planning; in-
tact abort requirements dictate hardware design requirements. Effects
of a failure in a system or subsystem causing the loss of a critical
function should be compensated for through appropriate safety margins
or redundance. This allows design of the vehicle so that the Orbiter
and its crew may return safely if such failures should actually occur.
The rule on failure modes and hazards, other than critical ones, is
that they shall be eliminated by design or by workaround only where
19
this is both feasible and cost effective.
The Panel's review this year was comprehensive in order to
define where we should focus our attention in the coming year.
In reviewing the po;;sible abort conditions, it appeared
to the Panel that the following system reviews are in order since we
want to make a determined effort to remove or minimize the risk of
as many of these contingencies as possible.
1. The explosion of a solid rocket booster, a main engine,
the external tank, an orbit maneuver engine, or a reaction control
system would, in all likelihood cause the loss of an orbiter. Thus,
all possible measures must be taken to prevent such an occurrence
or to provide warning so that such an explosion could be prevented
2. The failure of the solid rocket boosters or the external
tank to separate constitutes a hazard that is difficult to evaluate.
There is no program in the control system to handle the failure of
the solids to separate even if they were finally ejected at the exter-
nal tank ejection signal. The crew should know what to do in such
a contingency or a program should be developed.
3. In the early flights there will be no shuttle to perform
rescue services, so effort should be made to minimize contingencies
which might cause rescue to be needed. These include doors ( payload
20
bay doors, or umbilical door) which cannot be closed prior to re-
entry or the failure of the external tank to separate.
4. A thorough analysis of thrust vector controls has not
been completed but it would appear that, with four computer channels
for such control, there is little likelihood of one power, plant (solid
or liquid) going hard over by itself. The solids, if the system fails,
go to a previously selected neutral position in order that control
can be maintained. The main liquid engines do not "fail" into such
a position and interference would exist with other "swinging" engines
if such a neutral position were held. Since the four computer channels
appear to be adequate for thrust vector control safety, it is suggested
that input and output devices and the mechanisms for moving the engines
be reviewed to be doubly assured that no "hard-overs" can exist in-
advertently.
5. It would appear that two APU failures in the orbiter
would make a reentry and a normal landing extremely marginal. Due
to the long storage time on orbit, it can be argued that two APU
failures on any given flight might be statistically conceivable.
Thus the adequacy of test and APU system design should be reviewed.
6. Loss of pressure in the cabin appears to be a singular
and important hazard. There are two cabin air supply systems and three
fuel cells which provide cabin air pressure and conditioning. The system
21
must operate for the entire mission and total failure would be fatal.
It is suggested that a concentrated review take place, seeking once
again, the strong confirmation that this is a remote enough risk to
take. A third air supply system might be feasible, and valuable.
7. There are several essential systems characterized by hav-
ing 11 3 engine" safety - the control system, the APU system on the Orbiter,
and the reaction control system. Since the loss of any of these total
systems would incapacitate the Orbiter, constant reevaluation is in
order. The common tankage for the RCS should be reassessed and par-
ticular attention should be paid to the APU's since the Orbiter would
not be able to return on one APU unless initial conditions were perfect.
8. The decisions regarding launch "destruct" have been
made for OFT. The decisions for operational flights: whether destruct
is needed, what it needs to destroy, who is in charge of specifying
its characteristics and actually commanding destruct are still to be
confirmed. Inherent in any such system where pilot escape is planned
is the problem of how to warn the pilot so that some escape may be
initiated.
In this coming year the Panel will review the management
system as it operates in working each of these eight points and the
conclusions so far. We, of course, will also try to make suggestions
that would reduce each risk that did not seem to be sufficiently
controlled.
22
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Finally, the "twin engine" characteristics of the cabin
pressure system and the consequence of sequential failures of the
orbiter APU's should receive priority attention. In addition a
thorough search of the logic of how the computer based thrust vector
control protects against hard-overs that are not commanded needs to
be made but currently the Panel does not have that degree of tech-
nical software expertise to serve the Panel. A similar detail review
should be made of the crossover capability which exists on the con-
trol system to maintain hydraulic pressure in the event of APU failure
with specific focus on the adequacy of maintaining; hydraulic pressure
in the main engine control valve system. If an APU shuts down there
will be an automatic shutdown of that engine being served.
D. RESPONSE TO PRIOR RECOMMENDATIONS
The Panel ha.s reviewed program response to other recommen-
dations, including those of the Hawkins Committee. The Pz.iel's ob-
servations are:
1. The authority for decision to accept these recommen-
dations properly resides with program management, who hav esponsi-
bility and accountability for the program.
2. Program Management gave the recommendations careful
consideration. As can be expected there are some differences in judg-
ment between program management and the advisory groups. Management
is trying to meet the intent of the majority of recommendations.
23
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Comprehensive review of integrating groups' operations
should be conducted regularly to insure responsiveness to program
needs.
B. The Chief Engineer for the Main Propulsion System should
be a member of the Systems Integration Review Panel.
C. Individuals at the systems integration level at JSC and
at Rockwell's Space Division should be given appropriate management
responsibility, authority and resources for contingency analysis and
planning.
D. Analysis and evaluation of the vehicle capability for off.-
design cases should be done now, rather than later when any necessary
changes would be prohibitively costly. Staffing needed for this
effort should be provided.
E. Since the program has decided to depend upon reliability
o:: the SRB as the major safeguard against failure, the management
system should ha-,a an integrated plan to assure there are appropriate
quality controls during the life cycle of the SRB, i.e., manufactur-
ing, checkout and reuse.
F. Since there is a potential for hazards to the SRB from the
aerodynamic environment or failure modes elsewhere in the vehicle,
a hazard assessment report on this area should be prepared for
management.
24
3.0 SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE
Dr. Seymour C. Himmel
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3.0 SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE
I. BACKGROUND
Task team activities were concentrated on the specific concerns
identified by the Panel during previous reviews and those resulting
from NASA in-house meetings and the Hawkins Comn-ttee efforts, The
areas singled out for examination included:
A. New and still to be proven technology.
B. Design conservatism to meet requirements for engine reuse.
C. Adequacy of the Electronic Controller, including its ability
to operate reliably in the engine environment.
D. Engine control capability and the results of credible failures.
E. The test program and its adequacy for achieving the engine
program objectives.
F. The Engine and its integration into the total Shuttle system.
This interim report provides a "snapshot" of the program as viewed
by the Panel and, where appropriate, assessments, recommendations, and
future plans for further reviews of the Space Shuttle Main Engine.
The Panel has had this critical Shuttle area under review on a
fairly continuous basis over the past two years, as shown in Table 1.
Attention has been focused on: status of design, test and fabrica-
tion development; current and projected problems; dominant uncertainties
in the design and expected performance; and technical and managerial
resolution of program problems and uncertainties, including trade-off
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studies. The sensitivity of the engine hardware/software development
to cos* and schedule influences is a part of the review process.
Pertinent background is found in the Space Shuttle Program's re-
spouse to the Panel's 1975 Annual Report. Those responses relating
directly to the SSME are provided in Appendix A. These comments were
provided to the Panel in October 1975.
In the coming months, the task team will continue to monitor and
examine the engine and component test programs and the Controller and
its software at both contractor and NASA locations. Members of the
Panel and task team will continue to attend in-house meetings and
reviews.
II. OBSERVATIONS
A.	 Management
There have been a number of organizational changes at Rocket-
dyne Division of the Rockwell International Corporation with the ob-
jective of strengthening their in-house efforts as well as to better
meet the current program needs. Among the more important changes were:
the establishment of an Associate Program Manager for the Controller
and the strengthening of engineering activities, particularly those
in support of the manufacturing effort.
The review process and system integration activities are
derivatives of those developed for the NASA Saturn engine programs.
28
From the material provided to the Panel, it appears that both the for-
mal and informal channels are operating well and the information flow
to those charged with the decisic ►-making process appears adequate.
A number of working-level panels and groups have been established to
meet special needs of the Shuttle program and the Main Engine in par-
ticular. These include:
1. "Space Shuttle Integration Reviews," Program Directive
14A, which provides technical inputs necessary to establish and main-
tain system specifications and to verify design compatibility of the
integrated vehicle.
2. "Space Shuttle Integrated Propulsion and Fluids Technical
Management Area," Program Directive 24, provides for technical manage-
ment and for a "Main Propulsion System Panel."
3. "Space Shuttle Ascent Flight Systems Integration Group,"
Program Directive 57, which supports the Systems Integration Review (SIR)
particularly in the ascent phase -hen the engines are utilized.
B.	 Technical
The more recent major reviews of the program include "SSME
Design Margin Review," in July 1975 and MSFC's Quarterly Reviews
of January 1976 and April 1976. The results of these review efforts
are included in the following sect i ons of this report. The SSME
Criti^al Design Review currently is scheduled for the September - October
29
1976 time frame.
The SSME Design Margin Review -was the culmination of an
extensive long-terns review initiated in the fall of 1974. It pro-
vided a much needed in-depth review of such items as the design cri-
teria, load calculations, assumptions used, methods of analysis,
analytical results and their meaning, concepts for increasing margins,
and Might constraints. It produced, as expected, a number of action
items and recommendattons. 'Typical of these were: (1) review methods
that call 	 used to identify incipient failures and devise a compatible
resolution; (2) use maximum ► throttling ramp rate; (3) limit thrust for
early flights to Rated Power Level; (4) continue to obtain materials
properties; and (5) increase hardware confidence by conducting tests
at higher pressures and temperature levels with added instrumentation.
All of these items are either under active consideration or in-work,
The Engine Controller posture at this time appears to be en-
couraging. Functional testing of the rack mounted BT-1 unit operating
with the Integrated Systam Test Bed engine firings, and environmental
testing of the structural thermal engineering model (SM-1), and the
Production Prototype unit (PP-1) indicate that, with the resolution
of some design problems, the flight configuration controllers should
meet system requirements. This will require a continued, determnined,
effort on the part of NASA, Rocketdyne and Honeywell (the Controller
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contractor). Most of the problems that surfaced during the test
program to date have been resolved or are in the process of being
resolved. These include, for example, memory system noise, cracked
solder joints, minor circuit design problems, manufacturing problems,
and electromagnetic interference (EMI) emanating from the power
supply. A major problem was the breaking during vibration testing
of wires that had been "stitch welded" on the Master Interconnect
Board. A concerted effort by NASA and contractors resulted in a
decision to examine a parallel design/development activity to em-
ploy Multilayer Boards which would eliminate the wires and thus
wire breakage. The Multilayer Board change, if used, would be applied
to the P-4 controller and subsequent units depending upon funding
constraints.
Because the Controller is attached directly to the upper en-
gine structure, the severity of the vibration environment has required
the design and installation of a vibration isolater (shock-mount)
system. This work is progressing rapidly now and appears to provide
the necessary attenuation as evidenced by the test results with an
early mount design. These results of tests with this early isolator
design indicated proper Controller operation after vibration testing
at 22.5 g in each of 3 axes for 30 minutes per axis. Using a revised
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design mount (isolator) the PP-2 Controller unit has been subjected
to test inputs of 22.5 g's for 7.5 hours in each of the three axes.
Although anomalies did crop up they do not appear to be major in that
redesign is not required, but that assembly and drawing compatibility
may require further attention. After completion of this test series
additional hours were run at the 22.5 g level to reconfirm the overall
acceptability of the current design. These appear to have been successful.
The Controller software programs have progressed a great deal
over the past year, but much is yet to be done. Software has been in
operation on the ISTB program and under laboratory tests. It is planned
to have the software delivered during 1976 with operational updates
made in 1977. It is noteworthy that the Controller system (the combi-
nation of software and hardware) has to date been able to shut down
the engine safely under normal and abnormal testing circumstances.
The SSME top priority items receiving major Rocketdyne manage-
ment attention at this time are:
1. High Pressure Fuel Tuvbopump Subsynchronous Whirl
2. High Pressure Oxygen Tu rbopump Performance
3. The 77.5:1 Nozzle Fabrication
4. Hot Gas Manifold Liner Excess Pressure Differential
5. Test Program
Briefly, the status of these items is:
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1. The High Pressure Fuel Turbo Pump axial thrust balance
system appears to be resolved. Modifications have been incorported
that have balanced the system up to 85% RPL to date. In addition,
the rotor is exhibiting subsynchronous whirl. These matters are
under active attack by the Project.
2. The High Pressure Oxygen Turbo Pump performance exhibited
performance (head rise) 20 percent lower than predicted. A design change
in the impeller has been implemented that should overcome this deficiency.
3. The full scale engine nozzle, expansion ratio of 77.5:1,
has encountered numerous fabrication difficulties caused by material
distortion in the welding process. Changes have been made in the de-
sign and the welding procedures that appear to provide a solution to
this problem, albeit at a projected increase in weight. Two redesigned
n=Ll es have been through a braze cycle and appears to have been success-
ful. Hot fire testing of nozzle ikl is scheduled for August 1976. It
appears that some further changes may be necessary since flight nozzle
jackets #3 and #4 ex perienced buckling.
4. The hot gas manifold coolant liner is the oxygen turbo
pump side of the hot gas manifold was found to have buckled as a result
of excessive pressure differential. It would appear that this had
occurred during the last high-power ISTB run. This problem occurred
as a result of contamination on the backside of the injector causing
an excessive pressure drop across the hot gas manifold liner. Additional
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holes were drilled in the primary faceplate of the injector to reduce resistance.
The test program is still in its early stages both at the
component and engine system level. Notable progress has been made
with all components with the exception of the full scale nozzle having
been operated to at least minimum power level and at least half having
reached rated power level conditions. The durations at higher power
levels have been, generally, short but do represent progress.
A serious incident occurred at the COCA lA Test Site on
February 4, 1976, during which the oxidizer turbomachinery subsystem
under test suffered substantial damage and significant damage was done
to the test stand and its facility equipment. Conclusions of the in-
cident investigation indicated that a facility oxygen flowmeter failed,
resulting in elements thereof breaking loose, moving downstream, and
impacting the seat of the facility LOX discharge throttle valve, caus-
ing ignition and burning. The resulting pressure rise fed back to the
turbomachinery under test and initiated cutoff. Before this could be
effected, however, the changes in machinery operating point, resulting
from the facility failure, caused the high pressure pump to cavitate,
lose balance piston function and fail.
This incident triggered a review of test facility design, con-
figuration, hardware, etc., throughout the engine program. The results
of these studies and the experience gained will be transmitted to other
Rockwell divisions and NASA. Corrective action has been initiated
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and it is anticipated that testing at COCA 1 will be resumed in
June. The impact of this incident is a test schedule slip of some ten
weeks.
The principal objective of the March 1976 review meeting
with Rocketdyne was to discuss the engine test program rationale and
philosophy. The program is very well documented in a "document tree"
that has at its apex the engine Program Development Plan and provides
a comprehensive picture of the test program. It covers both develop-
ment and certification test plans culminating with the Final Flight
Certification of the engine.
The testing is governed by Design Verification Specificat^)ns
that provide details of test requirements and objectives and cross-
references, as to the source, eacr ► requirement and what constitutes
verification. The system also includes a "constraint map" called
Bench Mark Control Points that establishes requirements for successful
lower level test completion prior to initiating tests at higher assembly
levels.
All told, the test program is well documented and contains
built-in feedback management control mechanisms to insure that con-
lints are not violated. The documents are evidence that much
effort was expended in planning the program and that it is a tightly
integrated and austere effort. If the documentation is to be faulted
35
at all, it would be that the rationale for the decisions/criteria
reflected in the program documents is not apparent therein. This will
require further discussions between Panel members and the design groups
involved.
III. ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The reviews and observations of the task team led to the follow-
ing current assessment of the engine program:
A. The program is in its early testing stage and is experiencing
the sorts of development problems that were not uncommon in previous
engine programs at this stage of the program. The engine is, of course,
a venture into a new area of technology and without the benefit of
experience it is difficult to predict where all the pitfalls may be.
However, they may be expected to lie in the area of how to design rocket
engines for "long" life.
B. Most of the components are exhibiting performance near pre-
dicted values. The key elements that will be investigated this rom-
ing year are stability and durability of the components and higher
assemblies.
C. The test program as currently planned will accumulate about
56 hours of engine testing at FFC (Final Flight Certification). This
is about the same test time accumulated on the F-1 and J-2 programs
at a comparable point, but these programs had about ten times the test
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hardware available. When pressed, and with the benefit of retro-
spective visual acuity, the Rocketdyne people will acknowledge that
they could probably have gotten along with one-half the hardware in
the earlier programs. This still leaves a disparity of a factor
of five in available test hardware for the present program. This
decision was made knowingly, the belief being that the more thorough
planning, drawing and design control, etc., of the current program
would obviate the need for more test hardware. It is important to
note that the die is cast, the lead time for added test hardware is
such that if it were ordered today it would probably not become avail-
able soon enough to help overcome problems ar,1 maintain the current
schedule.
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APPENDIX A: RESPONSE TO PANEL'S ANNUAL REPORT
STATEMENT
The major challenges of significance for crew safety on the Space
Shuttle Main Engine are materials behavior under severe environments,
weld integrity, POGO suppression, and engine controller performance
and reliability. Therefore, the results of the test program will be
critical to developing confidence in these areas.
RESPONSE
SSME Materials Behavior Under Severe Environments
(a) An extensive analysis and test program is well under way.
The fracture mechanics test program has been expanded to include more
materials and components. Fracture mechanics analyses include load
cycling and environmental conditions, alloy/condition combinations,
weld combinations, and the effects of coatings and weld overlays.
These analyses will be verified by the test program. Minimum detect-
able flaw sizes will be established by nondestructive methods. In
addition, an assessment of the structural margins in the SSME with
regard to structural, weight, and performance requirements was con-
ducted by a high 'Level team composed of members from JSC and MSFC.
All 117 components reviewed meet the engine safety factor requirement
of 1.4 at full power level, and 88 of these meet a 1.5 safety factor
at full power level.
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SSME Weld Integrity
(b) Fabrication of the first engine and supporting components
revealed areas requiring improvements in weld integrity. Extensive
action has been taken in the area of weld analysis, redesign of some
weld joints, converting from manual to automatic welding, evaluating
of process parameters, upgrading/increasing staff, upgrading equip-
ment and improvements in inspection anc quality control procedures
to assure good welds.
POGO Suppression
(c) A continuing analytical program is under way and being pursued
to understand the POGO phenomenon and its implications to the SSME by
NASA field centers and their contractors. A POGO integration panel,
chaired by Dr. Harold Doiron of JSC, has been in operation since
June 1973, to continually review analytical and test data. The POGO
suppressor has been baselined and a comprehensive test program on
individual component parts is already under way. Engine tests will
verify the POGO suppressor system. Extensive use has been made of
Saturn data in designing the test program.
Engine Controller Performance and Reliability
(d) High priority by top management at Honeywell, Rocketdyne,
MSFC, and Headquarters is being applied in this area. Because of
current problems with the controller interconnect system (inboard
master interconnect system) and the fact that it is difficult to
I
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manufacture and reproduce, two studies have been initiated on an
interconnect redesign effGrt as a product improvement. Furthermore,
we are proceeding to mount the controller on isolators (shock-mounts)
which significantly reduce all vibration energy into the controller
at frequencies above 100 Hertz. In addition, RTV potting and foam
have been added to the inboard master interconnect board to reduce
wire stress concentration and dampen the wires dynamics. It should
be noted that the wire breakage problem we have encountered has been
associated with the inboard half of the controlLer interconnect system,
and not the memory plated wire.
41
4.0 ORBITER THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM
Dr. William A. Mrazek
Mr. Howard K. Nason
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4.0 ORBITER THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM
I.	 BACKGROUND
During 1975 and the first half of 1976 the Panel and the Orbiter
.	 Thermal Protection System (TPS) task team conducted detailed fact-
finding sessions at JSC, Rockwell Space Division, and Lockheed, Sunny-
vale. During this period, special attention was paid to the following
areas:
A. Current requirements which dictate the type and coverage
provided by the Reusable Surface Insulation (RSI), and the Leading
Edge Structural Subsystem (LESS).
B. Tile materials and coatings.
C. RSI and LESS installation and maintenance, with emphasis on
protecting doors and protuberances, and on sealing of aerodynamic
control surface openings.
Our most recent meeting with those personnel responsible for the
management and integration of the Orbiter. TPS was on May 24, 1976 at
JSC. Because of the interactions between the Orbiter TPS and other
Shuttle elements it has come under review by other task teams to vary-
ing degrees, e.g., Ground Test and Flight Test task teams, Risk Manage-
ment task team, etc., resulting in supportive efforts.
The following Orbiter TPS development milestones are noted in
order to place the current state of the TPS in perspective.
A.	 TPS Design Review was conducted August 1975.
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iB.	 TPS Delta Preliminary Design Review was completed May 1976.
,''	 C.	 TPS Critical Design Review is scheduled for May 1977,
D. Certification for the first manned orbital flight test is
scheduled for the first quarter of 1979.
II. OBSEVATIONS
Requirements for the design, fabrication and maintenance of the
Orbiter TPS components have been firmed-up to the extent that basic
materials have been selected, the TPS "design to" baseline for OFT #1
has been defined to assure a safe first mission, TPS failure effects
have been explored, installation methodology is evolving, and develop-
ment tests are supporting all of these efforts. An interesting example
of RSI requirements are those for mission life for HRSI, LRSI and
FRSI as noted below:
A. High Temperature Reusable Surface Insulation (HRSI)
100 missions for "acreage" tiles with maximum temp' s 23(10°F
1 or more missions for elevon and nose tiles, temp = 2371) 0 to 250c0F
1 mission for the body flap tiles, temp = 25000 to 2800°F
B. Low Temperature Reusable Surface Insulation (LRSI)
100 missions for all tiles with maximum temperature 157 1200O
C. Flexible Reusable Surface Insulation (FRSI)
100 missions with maximum temperature under 7000 F during entry
30 or more missions with maximum temperature under 750 0 F on entry,
8300 F on ascent and over temperature capability on a single
mission to 9000 F.
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Updating and refining of aerothermodynamic analyses has resulted
in heating predictions which relax the requirements (heat loads and
temperatures along with times of application) in some areas while
tightening them slightly in others. The net effect is the increase
in the area which can be covered with the FRSI (coated Nomex felt),
and a decrease in overall TPS weight,
Substantial progress has been made in tile moisture proofing,
coating, bonding and installation. The method for depositing the
moisture prevention material has been changed to vapor deposition
thus expanding the kinds of materials that can be considered. A
new polymer, vapor deposited, has been sufficiently tested that its
timely full qualification can be expected. The unexplained cracking
of the Lockheed 0050 coating has resulted in its being replaced on
the HRSI by the Ames Research Center (NASA) RCG coating. Lockheed
0050 coating still is to be used on the LRSI tiles. After early pro-
blems with the manufacture and storage of the basic glass for tile
production, Johns Mansville has now produced material that appears to
be satisfactory, with a substantial reduction in voids and inciisions.
It is emphasized that this is not a hazard or safety problem, but a
problem of producing smooth surface tile which affects bonding and
installation time. A method has been evolved by Rockwell's Space
Division to provide computer-based contours to Lockheed, which are used
1
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to machine the external (exposed) faces of the tiles. In addition,
a system of grouping tiles in an assembly fixture has been worked out
so that the entire cluster can be machined to proper contours as a unit.
The same fixture is used to transport the tile and to hole it in arrays
for attaching to the Orbiter skin. Finally, the assembly system in-
cludes the masking of one row in the fixture so that this row is not
glued to the surface. It is removed to provide edge room for the
adjacent fixture and the retained tiles are then inserted and fixed
to the surface after the arrays are installed. An improved system
for bonding the tiles to the Strain Isolator Pads (SIP) and then to
the Orbiter skin should be verified by September 1976.
Orbiter penetrations, doors and dynamic seal areas continue to
receive a great deal of attention. Such locations include: payload
bay doors, vent doors, main and nose landing gear doors, LESS to RSI
interfaces, wing/elevon, aft fuselage/body flap, and rudder/speed
brake gap areas. In resolving the problems associated with these dynamic
areas, a "brush" type seal using silica fibers was tried and has been
found unacceptable and alternate designs are being investigated. The nose
gear door has been redesigned to eliminate some problems experienced
with sticking due to thermal sealing.
III. ASSESSMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
At the present time, a number of previously nagging issues have
48
been resolved yet a good number remain. These are caused in part by
the technical problems and in part by the schedule-budget tradeoffs
that have had to be made.
A. Current experience with the RSI shows that is has low re-
sistance to ground handling damage, but a good capability to sustain
damage without catastrophic failure during induced environmental
exposure. The RSI installation is cost-schedule sensitive with respect
to (1) tile gap and step criteria, (2) tile geometry, and (3) instal-
nation techniques.
B. The tile material itself appears to be satisfactory from the
standpoint of production and processing. However, the program to
fully characterize structural capabilities has been delayed. This
can result in the delivery and installation of tiles on the Orbiter
before full confirmation of its adequacy. The risk appears to be
acceptable from a safety standpoint as long as the data for confir-
mation are obtained before first flight.
C. Concerns associated with the LESS include the ability to
maintain required gaps and steps between the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon
material (RCC) segments and the interfacing HRSI tiles (concern about
early tripping of boundary layer). Additional concerns include mission
life capability, and cracks on the nose cap shell observed during
development testing.
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D. The ability to adequately protect vehicle openings from the
high energy plasma during entry has yet to be proven. This appears
to be receiving adequate attention, but may require some redesign
effort, prior to the first OFT, which is not contemplated at this
time. This may also serve to expand the current Development Flight
Instrumentation requirements.
E. The first orbital flight test mission, OFT #1, is to use
trajectory shaping to minimize the total heat load and structural
bonding layer temperature, and at the same time to accommodate tra-
jectory dispersions, early boundary layer transition and the uncer-
tainties associated with the TPS predicted performance. This should
assure first mission safety.
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5.0 AVIONICS MANAGEMENT
Mr. Herbert E. Crier
Hon. Willis M. Hawkins
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5.0 SHUTTLE AVIONICS SYSTEM
I.	 BACKGROUND
The Avionics System for the Shuttle is the combination hardware/soft-
ware system which controls and directs the Shuttle flight. Through its
sensors, computers, and interface units it coordinates and implements
all functions of the flight except for the specific control of the
engine which is done by a separate computer system built onto the en-
gine. The computers of the Avionics system are the nerve center of
the Shuttle, and hence must function for the flight to be performed.
Appropriate redundancy is built into the system and provision has been
made for manual as well as automatic input. The matter of redundancy
is not simple, in that the software system itself is a single point
failure item except in part for the backup guidance program. This
fact is the driver that makes the verification and testing of the
software so important in order that the postulated redundancy will
be realized.
Because of the criticality of the Avionics System and the inherent
challenges in managing this area, the task team meets frequently with
the various organizations at the Johnson Space Center and the hard-
ware and software contractors. In addition the team meets with the
technical assessment group at JSC and the Chief Engineer to discuss
their reviews of this area. Inspection trips are made to both
ADL and SDL integration laboratories.
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II. OBSERVATIONS
The current state of the system is that the hardware has been
designed and procured. Equipment is coming in and is being de-bugged
and operated in the ADL and SAIL laboratories both at Rockwell and
at Johnson Space Center. There are hardware and system problems that
are being worked diligently and that should be monitored, (e.g., the
limitation on Avionics cooling), but the quality of the hardware seems
to be very good in light of the stage of the program.
With the hardware in the stage it is in, emphasis has gone to
the integration of the various elements and the requirements for
their proper operation which, in total, constitute the specification
for the software system. There has been an initial design of a soft-
ware system, but as specific component data become available and
mission requirements become more firm, variations or new input must
be expected in the software system. These variations are the basis
of our concern with the Avionics System.
The computer system in the Shuttle is complicated, and verifi-
cation of the software is difficult to quantify. In fact, the con-
fidence in software verification is directly proportional to the time
spent in such verification; that is, the thoroughness and extent of
the verification procedures. In general, one is not confident to say
that a software system is reliable unless it has been extensively used.
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The criticality of the software system and the difficulty of quanti-
fying its verification make it mandatory to have an independent assess-
ment of the software. Current proposals are to program the testing
at ADL and in SAIL so as to perform a complete, independent check of
the software. This is a good plan and it must be implemented in a
timely manner, and then changes must be rigorously controlled.
The major problem with the Avionics software system is two-fold.
First, the tendency of hardware people to solve anomalies in their
hardware by changes in the software; and, second, the better definition
of the specifications for mission operations which results in a greater
software requirement than was initially contemplated for the system.
Both of these factors, and particularly late timing, affect the degree
of confidence that one has in the formal verification. It is imper-
ative that the computer groups have sufficient time for the software
verification, and the simulation laboratories have time to check as
deadlines approach. While the first orbital flight is some time away,
the ALT flights are almost upon us. The organizational structure to
police and drive this program is not readily apparent.
In the course of our discussions several factors became obvious.
The first was that the NASA management system is geared to establish
communications and coordinate the activities of a number of entities
at different locations. However, it does not adequately identify a
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specific Avionics responsibility. This system, through its various
reviews and panels does, in fact, successfully accomplish a major
task of integration, but it is ponderous and time consuming when it
must respond to specific, immediate problems in real time. The people
in the total system are for the most part very experienced, and an
informal system of coping with the real time technical problems has
grown up. This system is absolutely vital in that it rings the bells
to alert the formal system and supplies the input necessary for the
more formal deliberations. This informal system should by no means
replace the formal system, but it should be recognized, directed and
integrated if the overall structure is to be optimized. From an
academic point of view an informal system, with its undefined re-
sponsibilities, can sometimes result in balls being dropped, partic-
ularly with inexperienced people. We must hasten to say that we feel
because of the quality of the personnel the present system is working
well. It could perhaps be better defined. We feel that program
management recognizes this, that the recent strengthening of the
Avionics integration activity will help and that the recognition by
the technical assessment group of the importance of the Avionics prob-
lem is a good sign. In discussions with the technical people it is
quite clear that the integration laboratories (ADL and SAIL), where-
in hardware is operated in systems of varying configurations, are
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very useful tools. These laboratories provide a real communication
channel between all the elements involved in the particular system
or subsystem being; tested. The joint experience gained here is essen-
tial in establishing confidence in the Avionics system and is abso-
lutely necessary as an independent check on the computer software veri-
fication.
The whole matter of computer programming and verification is per-
haps the element of the system most difficult to assess. The nature
of the system and of the current stage of the program inhibits the
develom_ ent of firm computer program requirements. As more simulation
experience is generated, for instance, the detailed requirements of
manned versus automatic flight undoubtedly will change, resulting in
program changes. In addition, the ALT flights will certainly produce
data which will require modifications to the programs. As these modi-
fications or new requirements are defined, a continuing effort must
be established to police the overall computer program. There is a
limit, and there are indications that requirements may exceed the
computer capacity. The response to such a situation must not reduce
the redundancy built into the computer system.
Verification of a computer program is a subjective and iterative
process and it is not easy to assign a confidence number in the same
sense that one does with hardware. It is particularly difficult for
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the lanel to achieve an assessment in this field. It would be help-
ful if a single individual were placed in charge.
III. ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The conclusion of reviews to date is that the hardware in the
Avionics system is in reasonable shape and that it will perform prop-
erly. The software system is currently in a state of flux and is now
being given attention, in an effort to scrub down or assign priorities
to the requirements and to examine opportunities for simplification.
We feel a centralization of control of the software in the program
would be beneficial. It is quite clear that because of the reduced
requirements on the system for the ALT. tests, the load on the computer
system is eased. However, confidence in the adequacy of the software,
even for this simpler flight program, has still not developed and the
Panel must monitor the software program assiduously between the present
time and the ALT test.
One conclusion is positive. The Shuttle team, on both the con-
tractor and government side, is composed of experienced, competent
people. This fact establishes confidence in the overall program, and
assures us that given enough time any contingency can be dealt with
properly.
Our recommenc.:.tions are:
A.	 A competent, knowledgeable person should be assigned at the
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Program Office level to perform the function of Chief Engineer-Avionics.
This may well be the recently appointed Manager, Orbiter Avionics Systems,
if he has the central responsibility for the software and the system
that it knits together.
B. The program of testing and simulation of the Avioncis system
should be given a high priority as it forms an independent verification
of the software. An additional important benefit of such testing is
that it involves a great number of subsystem designers and will form
a valuable, real-time communication link in the technical management
and integration system.
C. The technical assessment group should establish an appro-
priate effort to quantify and assess the degree of confidence one can
assign to the planned software verification. In our opinion this
group should be supplemented by outside experts in the software systems
verification field.
D. The recent emphasis on the responsibility 9f the Avionics
Integration Office was a move in the right direction and, if appro-
priate, further efforts should be made to more clearly define specific
software responsibilities.
E. Future actions of the Panel should be limited to monitoring
progress of the system so as to judge the state of readiness prior
to ALT and the first orbital flight. Should the Panel be expected
to assess in detail the software verification, it will need to be
supported by an expert in that specific field.
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Dr. Charles D. Harrington
Mx. Herbert E. Grier
Mr. Willis M. Hawkins
Mr. Lee R. Scherer
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6.0 RISK ASSESSMENT
I. BACKGROUND
A task team has been formed to review the risk management system
and its handling of specific challenges. The task team obtained its
information by meetings at JSC and the principal contractor with both
managers and the specialists working for them. These meetings were
held in September and November 1975, and February and May 1976. Num-
erous written reports also were provided to substantiate decisions and
to demonstrate the procedures used to assure that safety problems are
evaluated adequately.
II. OBSERVATIONS
Tne areas reviewed included the management system for application
of lessons learned from prior programs to Shuttle and the specific
cases of the controlled use of teflon insulation, of 26 gauge electri-
cal wiring and of threaded fasteners. The Panel also reviewed the
approach to crew and range safety. Finally, we reviewed the approach
to assessing and controlling the aggregate or toal risk on the program.
A.	 Lessons Learned
The subject of lessons learned is a complicated one. Ob-
viously, a lesson must first be identified as such and there must be
agreement as to the proper steps to avoid further occurrence. Once
these two steps are properly taken it appears that adequate procedures
exist to track the correct application.
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Retention methods are:
a. JSCM 8080 - Standards and Criteria
These are imposed when applicable on subcontractors.
b. AFSC Handbook DH-1-6
This contains checklists and safety techniques
and is used by JSC safety division; for check-
list inputs.
C. Various JSC Experience Retention Documents
Examples are:
84 Apollo experience retention reports
JSC 09096 Lessons Learned Skylab
JSC 0134 B Space Flight Hazards
JSC 02681 Non Metallic Materials
JSC 08980 Field Experience Data
Mission Assessments (Safety), Apollo 7
through ASTP
In addition a lessons learned document has been prepared
which states whether the lesson is applicable to Shuttle and how it
is to be dispositioned. This document should be continuously updated
and safety reviews of Shuttle compared with it. As of June 10th, 1975,
the document showed 476 lessons applicable. The question of the proper
steps to take to avoid further occurrence is a much more difficult
one. For example, the question of man-in-the-loop versus full auto-
mation appears to be subject to fine tuning decisions, with some
differences of opinion still existing.
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B. Use of Teflon
The use of Teflon is being carefully tracked. It is felt
to be the safest insulation material available (where the requirements
suggest its use) as long as it is not exposed to temperatures high
enough to cause decomposition. There appears, therefore, to be little
effort to restrict its use where it is otherwise advantageous. A
possible exception is the use inside the oxygen tank of the External
Tank. This was originally felt to be safe since only instrument signal
current is carried by these wires. However, at the time of the task-
team meeting on February 9, 1976, consideration was being given to re-
placing this section with stainless steel coated, ceramic insulated
wiring (as was done in the Apollo oxygen tanks) despite the appreciable
weight penalty. Since then the possible acceptability of TFE plastic
is being investigated. This reconsideration is occasioned by updated
thermal analyses which showed that high temperatures (500 OF)may be
encountered in use. This item had been closed out in the December 10,
1975, Major Safety Concerns Document (JSC 09990) based upon engineering
data and, when appropriate, initiation of new or more extensive engineer-
ing analyses. It also illustrates the necessity to maintain a vigilance
over revised data and the effect on closed hazards. In this instance,
the review system worked when the hazard was reopened.
The cold flow characteristics of Teflon are said not to
cause any problems for Shuttle applications. This issue arose during
Apollo fabrication days because of a bad batch of Teflon which was
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not typical of good quality material. Since then, acceptance tests
have been introduced to apply to each new batch of Teflon to assure
that no material will be accepted and used in Shuttle which may be
deficient in cold flow characteristics. As a result this will no
longer be considered a limitation on the places where Teflon may be
used. In addition there are firm controls and requirements (Rockwell
Space Division Specification ML- 0303-0029A and ML-0303-0013 , and
Martin Specification STP 6506) which relate to minimum bend radius,
clamping force, sharp edges, wire bundle sleeves for protection,
harness routing, etc. Rigorous inspection verifies this. Thin walled
Teflon has a protective top coat of polyimide resin which restricts
cold flow.
C.	 The Use of Small Gauge Copper Wire
Because of the problem on Apollo with breakage of 26 AWG
copper wire the use of this has been largely eliminated, replacing it
with 22AWG or heavier. However, in an appreciable percentage of the
total footage ;;%-8%) it has been found impracticalbe to use wire this
large and stiff. Where 26AWG wire has been used it has been made of
an alloy of copper having considerably higher tensile strength. It
has also been bundled together so that no individual strands can be
flexed and broken. OV 101 is being built in this manner. The Panel
feels that this problem has been handled properly.
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It should be noted that there are many manufacturers' items
such as instruments and black boxes which may contain much finer
wires. However, these are firmly attached and protected and are not
subject to flexing or other mishandling during installation or use.
The Panel is satisfied that the design is proper.
D.	 The Controls on Threaded Fasteners
The Panel found that NASA and its contractors procure fasteners
from a variety of sources which meet NASA and DOD specifications. In the
manufacture of these fasteners the single element method of gauging is
almost always used because it identifies, for the manufacturer, changes
in the shape or quality of the threads and alerts the manufactu rer to
tool and roll wear before the fasteners get out of specification. It
is to the manufacturer's economic advantage to use this system since
his rejection rate is decreased (i.e., product consistently is of
high quality). In addition to gauging, the manufacturer invariably
uses an optical comparator and does metallurgical and physical tests
on the materials. This whole procedure, statistically applied, in-
sures shipment of high quality fasteners at the minimum price consistent
with that quality.
After certification the user, i.e., NASA or its contractors,
is primarily concerned with whether a fastener falls within an accept-
able envelope of tolerances which can be measured quite rapidly with
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go-no go gauges. If the fastener does not meet this test it is re-
turned to the vendor for analysis and replacement. While this might
appear to be an arbitrary procedure it is not, because the major factor
affecting the failure of a fastener is the proper application of that
fastener. Proper application is the facet of the problem that NASA
and its contractors must control. Such factors as out of tolerances
of parts, insufficient radii at corners, and improper torquing of the
fastener more often are responsible for failure than are minor variations
in the shape of the thread. We do not believe that one can document
a single failure due solely to the threads themselves when they have
passed a go—no go inspection. Failures almost always are due to
improper application of the fastener and, in a few cases, to a
material or metallurgical problem. The improper application of
a Fastener is prevented first by proper engineering design and review,
and second by assembly inspection to see that the proper tolerances
are present in the fastened parts and that the correct fastener and
torque have been used. The metallurgical aspect of the problem is
taken care of by chemical and metallurgical tests as a part of in-
coming inspection.
The experience of NASA and the DOD, over many years, has
resulted in a statistical testing program on fasteners which NASA and
its contractors observe. An analysis of these procedures has been
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made by NASA and the Panel has reviewed it. In our opinion the pro-
gram being followed by NASA and its contractors is appropriate and
results in the proper degree of safety. We feel that this has been
demonstrated by the performance of past NASA projects and by the
immense experience of DOD. We further feel that should a fastener
failure occur, it almost always will be traced to causes not controlled,
or indicated, by the gauging systems.
E.	 Crew and Range Safety
During launches of the initial Shuttle missions, ground
command and destruct capabilities exist on the External Tank and on
each SR3. T'ne Orbiter 'ruin Engines cannot be shut down by ground
command.
The crew cannot inhibit ground destruct, but are provided
warning in advance of such action. Two ejection seats are provided
for the crew. Use of ejection seats and of ground destruct devices
after the initial missions still is the subject of considerable contro-
versy. There is no precedent in previous programs, since the Shuttle
system is a combination of launch vehicle and transport aircraft.
Additional complexities result from the split responsibilities be-
tween Shuttle program managers and national range commanders, and from
the fact that later operational missions will carry "passengers", for
whom ejection capability probably would be impracticable.
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It is the opinion of the Panel that planning for future
missions should proceed with a fundamental ground rule that the cap-
ability for destruct by range safety personnel and the capability of
escape by all people onboard go hand-in-hand.
Under current plans, adherence to this ground rule would
mean that both ejection seats and destruct systems will be removed
when more than two people are on board. It seems reasonable that
removal of sc:h de Aces will be an acceptable risk after demonstration
by a few successful flights.
F. Response to Recommendations on Hydraulic Fluid
The Panel earlier had recommended that the choice of hydraulic
fluid be re-examined.
On November 18, 1975, detailed presentations were made on
the comparison of Yellow Oil (MIL-H-83282) a*:d Red Oil (MIL-H-5606)
for use as hydraulic fluids. These comparisons showed that Yellow
Oil appeared superior to Red Oil in regard to flammability over a
narrow temperature range and under certain physical conditions. In
some other respects, such as corrosion and low temperature viscosity,
Red Oil was superior. The decision has been made to stay with Yellow Oil
due to its lesser fire risk. Precautions will need to be taken to
keep out water (corrosion) and to avoid excessively low temperatures.
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G. The Risk Management System and Aggregate Risk Assessment
The Panel found a well-developed independent hazard identi-
fication and risk assessment system, the members of which participate
in program decision making. They provide formal reports to program
management such as summaries of major safety concerns and of the
actions being taken to assure management awareness. They have also
just completed the initial mission safety assessment report for the ALT
flights.
The Panel gave particular attention to management control
of both the total or aggregate risk on the program as well as the
control of specific hazards.
Aggregate risk has been defined by the .JSC Safety Division
as the sum of the effects of hardware and operational hazards upon
the event, series of events, ur mission, and is measured in terms
of adverse impact on personnel or critical equipment. The manage-
ment approach to this assessment is through the safety concerns pro-
cedure. In this procedure all inputs to safety questions, including
RID's are examined through System Level Hazard Analysis, in preparing the
Shuttle level SAR, and screened by a Criteria Committee. They are either
resolved through modifications or accepted as risks. They become part
of the Safety Concerns Index and Safety Concerns Summary Report and as
such are direct input to the Mission Safety Assessment. The latter
becomes the true evaluation point for aggregate risk assessment. It
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appears that this procedure is adequate from a management point of
view to assure that all safety issues, once identified as such, are
properly tracked and assessed.
While major hazards are brought before management for their
evaluation tf-.ere is also the question of how you control minor risks
and evaluate their impact on the level of aggregate risk being accepted
in the program. This is no simple matter because management cannot
review every decision and there are not the resources to work every
"what if" situation. Therefore, the task team has been in discussions
with the safety offices on how to strengthen controls or audits in this
area. As a result additional controls have been instituted.
The Screening Board for the "Major Safety Concerns Document"
has been passing judgment only upon those issues which are considered
significant safety drivers and hence has not reviewed those having
little impact. To perform a check of the disposition of these minor
risks, the Screening Board has instituted a new procedure whereby
it will include an audit of twenty minor issues at each Screening
Board meeting to determine that they have been properly evaluated
and dispositioned. If the audit reveals deficiencies, a more
extensive investigation will be completed. It 0,ould be noted
that Board membership has been recently revised to include KSC
and MSFC representation. The method of assessing the total impact of
l
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these risks is to track the safety issues for satisfactory closeout
and to report on them in the Mission Safety Assessment Documents.
These documents contain the Safety office's judgment on the acceptability
of the "aggregate risk." This is a subjective, rather than quantative,
evaluation of the cumulative accepted risks and actions being taken
to resolve open items.
The Panel met with senior program management to review their
approach in developing policies that determine the criteria for risk
assessment and decision making at subordinate levels. These discussions
also included senior management's approach to decision making at their
level where it has been their judgment to accept risks. The Panel was
both reviewing critical decisions that have already been made and re-
inforcing management's controls to assure that safety not slip from
its normal top priority because of cost and schedule pressures in the
period ahead. Among the points made by management in these discussions
were:
1. Decisions involving any significant reduction in
program requirements are reviewed by senior management to assure a
judgment that is objective and sensitive to the requirements of public
accountability. This is evidenced by the way the decision was made
on contingency abort capability during the SRB burn period.
2. Any decision on safety is a judgment on how far
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to go to enhance or guarantee safety. There are specific areas
where safety margins have been reduced but the management judgment
is that the margins are still sufficient.
3. Redundancy is not synonymous, with safety because
the complexity of a redundant system may introduce new hazards that
reduce the overall safety of the system. Excess redLtidancy, or appended
protection systems, may cause engineers to produce designs that are not
optimum but depend upon these additions to make them acceptable.
4. The number of single failure points that could
cause critical situations are not greater than in Apollo or Skylab.
In fact, Shuttle has a higher safety factor because of the flexibility
available to terminate the mission.
5. Aggregate risk is hard to measure but the program
is making a conscious effort to identify the magnitude. The Mission
Safety Assessment document is one judgment. The program SR,&QA people
are preparing a form of aggregrate risk assessment associated with the
program requirements review results,
6. The ground test program provides the best assur-
ance that we understand the system, its capabilities and limitations.
While some changes have been made in the test program, piggybacking
tests or deferring them, basic requirements have not been compromised,
7. The ALT flights and the subsequent orbital flight
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program will develop confidence in the vehicle. They provide for
moving into situations of greater risks in carefully considered incre-
ments, so that the new risk on any one flight is acceptable or cannot
reasonably be reduced further.
III. ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Panel's ,judgment as to whether the total aggregrate risk is
acceptable can only be arrived at over the course of time after care-
ful study of the mission assessment documents and other pertinent
data. Once the program is beyond the development flights and is in
the operational phase, aggregate risk should be minimized by exper-
ience and by the repetitive nature of the flights. Safety questions
which the Panel considers significant are being worked, although the
resources available may not permit in-depth investigation of all
minor issues.
The concept of re-usability introduces a new type of risk in
the Shuttle program which was not encountered in previous, single-shot
programs. For example, the TPS and the landing requirements introduce
a number of safety problems for which experience is lacking.
The final aggregate risk assessment should focus heavily on
"what if" questions.
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7.0 GROUND TEST AND GSE PROGRAMS
Lt. Gen. Warren D. Johnson, USAF
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7.1 GROUND TESTS
I. BACKGROUND
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel has studied NASA philosophy
pertaining to the entire Space Shuttle System, the "Space Shuttle Veri-
fication Program" and particularly the ground tests aspects of that
Verification Program. Since the Panel has been in existence for
several years and was involved in Apollo, Skylab, and the recent
joint US-Soviet Apollo-Soyuz space flight, an inevitable comparison
with these programs is made and, indeed, the uniform approach to test-
ing reflects NASA experience. Past NASA programs have been eminently
successful. Yet even NASA has suffered temporary failures, and the
Panel was created as a result of a disastrous accident. The Panel
is conscious that NASA faces a need for major cost reductions in
order to stay within programmed costs for the Space Shuttle program.
This cost reduction effort could impact on safety unless management
review is thorough. 1, part of our examination focused on this
possibility.
The Panel is examining the Ground Test Program as it pertains
to preparation for the Approach and Landing Tests, to the Orbital
Flight Tests and eventually the operational orbital. flights. Ac-
tivity to date has concentrated on the pre-operational phases. The
major effort has been to assist NASA in assuring the Space Shuttle
System will fly safely as a space vehicle and as an aircraft when it
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reenters the atmosphere to return for landing. In gathering data we
have studied the planned Space Shuttle Verification Program, some
individual ground tests, and the Hawkins Review to identify possible
problem areas. Based on those studies, visits to Rockwell and the
Johnson Space Center have been made.
As previously indicated the Space Shuttle Verification Program,
and specifically the ground test portion, is based on past highly
successful NASA programs. Experienced NASA management has designed
and tracked the program since the go-ahead for Space Shuttle was
given in 1969. There is a strong reliance on this past experience
and an excellent use of "lessons learned." However, major NASA pro-
grams in the past have dealt with Space Vehicles, one time flights,
and better funding priorities. Moreover, past programs were experi-
mental in nature as opposed to operational. Thus, new problems can
be expected.
The Ground Test Program is extensive. Obvicusly, the Panel can-
not examine all details, nor is that desirable or necessary. The
Panel's contribution should be to identify areas in which thei p. aro
risks not faced in past NASA programs and/or areas in which previous
difficulties have been encountered. Activities to date have identi-
fied these priority areas for Panel examination.
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II. OBSERVATIONS
The Ground Test Organization appears adequate. The Test Organ-
ization is sufficiently distinct from the organization which designed
the Shuttle. Thus, testing objectivity should be assured.
It also appears that there is a reasonable mix of space vehicle
and aircraft experience. Rockwell is applying its considerable air-
craft expertise to the Space Shuttle Systems, as well as its space
experience. They realize the Orbiter must perform as a space vehicle
and an aircraft. NASA has an adequate mix of Space experts and pilots
who have flown and tested aircraft, including "lifting bodies" with
shuttle-like characteristics. The astronauts are deeply involved in
the planning and the ground test programs. Throughout NASA there is
a reasonable balance of scientists, engineers, engineer-pilots, and
other skills. Cost reduction efforts and ensuing personnel. reductions
have, as yet, not destroyed this core of capability.
An adequate interface between Rockwell and subcontractors appears
to exist. The Rockwell organization indicated a realization of the
responsibility for monitoring tests conducted by subcontractors. Any
test failure must be reported within 24 hours and Rockwell monitors
compliance. This will be further checked by the Panel in visits to
subcontractors.
Because of funding constraints, some tests have been cancelled.
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It appears, however, that management has provided an adequate review
of the risks involved in each such reduction.
III. ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Ground Test Program as originally envisioned had a larger
scope of full scale model tests. In the reduction a greater reliance
was placed on quarter (1/4) scale model tests. Additional cost re-
duction efforts have led to some modification of 1/4 scale model tests.
Also, some originally scheduled test conditions changed due to lack
of availability of components. Planned full scale model tests were
directly related to 1/4 scale model tests - designed to provide a one-
to-one comparison in such areas as Influence Coefficient and Stiffness
Characteristics. The lack of these one-to-one comparisons could have
an adverse impact. Management is aware of these reductions and has
assessed the risk.
The Panel was concerned with the adequacy of structural testing
prior to ALT and has inquired into this at some length.
A. Structural testing of the Orbiter was compared to the test-
ing of the Boeing 747, the Douglas DC-10 and the Lockheed 1011 (sim-
ilar wide body aircraft). The two former were tested to a greater
extent. The 1011 testing was more limited and would tend to indicate
that the Orbiter test plan is adequate.
B. ALT will not include thermal and ascent stresses which will
i
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be encountered in orbital flights. Structural analysis prior to ALT
assumes these stresses are present, thus creating a margin of safety.
However, actual structural tests will not be completed prior to ALT.
C. The Orbiter will be limited to 75% of structural loads
(limiting weight and G-forces), during the ALT. The extent of ground
tests in this respect is somewhat less than that to which wide body
aircraft have been subjected prior to first flight. Perhaps require-
ments for wide body aircraft are not appropriate for Shuttle. On the
other hand, even higher standards might be appropriate. It is suggested
that this be a subject for a later meeting of the entire Panel.
There is concern about the testing for the Payload Bay Doors.
It is clear that fillure to close these doors would preclude safe
reentry. Many steps are being taken:
A. NASA (JSC) is making a comprehensive study of the history
of "jams."
B. Conservative "overreach" is planned.
C. Many tests are planned.
D. EVA capability is being planned. Tools are being considered
and an EVA working group exists.
I. However, some payloads could preclude access by EVA.
2. There is some indication that test payloads during
early Orbital Flight Tests are being considered that could interfere
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with manual back-up For closing payload bay doors. Recommend no such
payloads be permitted during early OFT.
No schedule margin exists in the event any major problems are
encountered in ground testing. This is a success-oriented program
and any major problems will impact dollars and schedules. This could
induce shortcuts that have safety implications. The Panel should
examine any major test failure and/or change in the test program in
order to act as an additional safeguard to the normal NASA management
review.
The review of changes and deletions to the Ground Test Program
appears to have been adequate to date. Further budget constraints
or a major problem could induce more changes. The Panel believes the
"point of diminishing return" must be close for changes in the Ground
Test Program. Thus, such changes should be brought to the attention
of the Panel as soon as they are defined.
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7.2 GROUND SITPPORT EQUIPMENT
I.	 BACKGROUND
Planning for and acquisition of Ground Support Equipment are
largely management problems as opposed to safety issues. However, the
Panel notes that such equipment acquisition for various past programs
traditionally has been the first to suffer in budget cuts. Moreover,
planning is difficult in the early stages of a program, pending devel-
opment of a firm mAintenance baseline. Thus when cuts or changes are
made, little time remains to adjust, and equipment deliveries often
lag operational requirements. Some safety impact may then result,
especially when ground handling and turn around are so dependent on
specialized and sophisticated equipment.
The planned turn around of 160 hours would be made more diffi-
cult to attain if equipment were not available in the configuration
and numbers required.
Orbital Flight Tests could be hampered if Ground Support Equip-
ment were not available. Delays in flight tests could be costly
and/or could impact on safety if shortcuts are attempted.
It appears prudent to examine whether the pressure to achieve
the 160 hour turn around could create safety problems.
If inherent safety problems exist in the interface between Ground
Support Equipment and flight hardware, the Panel wishes to identify them
and assure itself these hazards are given adequate attention.
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II. OBSERVATIONS
JSC and KSC are aware of the criticality of Ground Support Equip-
ment and of their responsibility for integration. Both are develop-
ing detailed planning for such equipment, considering life cycle re-
quirements and hazard analyses across the interface with flight hard-
ware. Both centers are working closely with the Air Force, which
eventually will operate the Space Shuttle System from Vandenberg.
Air Force personnel are on hand at JSC and KSC for this purpose.
All seem to be aware that the 160 hour turn around forces better
planning for support equipment. However, they assert that they are
guarding against the possibility that the turn around requirement
could influence shortcuts. They clearly state that the 160 hour
turn around is a goal for the operational phase and that it
will not be at rempted in the orbital flight tests or in early opera-
tional flights.
Planning is tied to vendor (subcontractor) availability. If a
vendor's production line is planned to be closed or reduced, JSC plans to
review the need to acquire support equipment prior to any such action.
Most testing during Orbital Flight Test and in later operational
flights is planned to be accomplished on-board the Orbiter, as dis-
tinguished from bench checks in a separate facility. Before attempt-
ing to repair a black box the malfunction will be clearly identified.
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III. ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Panel should continue surveillance of Ground Support Equip-
ment and should examine the interface of some of the more critical
items with flight hardware.
Panel interest should focus initially on equipment required for
auto land tests. (Subcontractor equipment is planned to be used to
cover most requirements for this and Orbital Flight Tests.)
The Panel also should follow changes and/or reductions planned
for support equipment, assuring that NASA reviews of such actions
consider all risks involved. (The NASA review process should equal
that for changes in the ground testing program.)
The Panel should question planning for Ground Support Equipment
as it visits selected vendors (subcontractors) and NASA centers.
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8.0 FLIGHT TEST PROGRAM
Mr. John L. Kuranz
Mr. Lee R. Scherer
Lt. Gen. Warren D. Johnson, USAF
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8.0 FLIGHT TEST PROGRAM
I.	 BACKGROUND
The Panel undertook to study the Approach and Landing Test Pro-
ject for the purpose of assessing the value and risks, in order to
determine if programming and/or management system changes should be
recommended to meet the primary test objectives. We believe these
objectives to be valid; they are:
A. To verify operational capability of the mated ferry config-
uration.
B. To confirm the subsonic aerodynamic characteristics of the
Orbiter and verify piloted and automatic approach and landing concepts.
C. To correlate wind tunnel data and flight data. An integral
part of the Panel's study was the examination of potentially hazardous
conditions associated with the design or operation of both the flight
and ground systems.
The Panel's most recent meeting with ALT management was May 24-25,
1976 at JSC. This was preceded by the following activities:
A. Met with ALT and Carrier Aircraft project officers at JSC
on November 18-19, 1975. Detailed discussions on the 747, orbiter
101, mated configurations and most current test and analytical data
supporting the ALT requirements and management decisions.
B. Session with ALT project personnel at Rockwell International
at Downey, California on October 29, 1975. Discussions related to
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Rockwell International's participation and implementation of their
role in the ALT project.
C. Shorter but significant fact-finding sessions were conducted
in Washington at NASA Headquarters on August 28, 1975 and at KSC on
December 3, 1975. These served to provide an overview of the ALT
project and indicated where further examination would be fruitful.
D. Attendance at the Orbiter ALT Critical Design Review con-
ducted at JSC on April 21, 1976.
E. Panel review and task team sessions at JSC, February 9-10, 1976.
These activities served to provide a well detailed and
up-dated background for further fact-finding and gave an integrated
perspective to the Panel. Included were major achievements that con-
tribute to program management's confidence in achievement of ALT
objectives.
In addition to these face-to-face sessions, numerous program
documents Taere supplied, including the ALT Project Management Plan
which, together with the candid and helpful dialogue with program
managers and engineers, allows the observations and assessments
which follow.
Before reading the section of this report covering observations
and assessment, it is worthwhile to review the 1LT Project background.
ALT covers only a small portion of the Shuttle Verification Program.
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Orbiter 101 and a modified Boeing 747 will be used for these tests.
Orbiter 101 configuration will be oriented toward the subsystems re-
quired for subsonic atmospheric flight. For the most part it will
not include subsystems required for space operations. Although not
carrying actual payloads, the Orbiter 101 will employ simulated pay-
load structure adequate to demonstrate the effects of payload weight,
center-of-gravity, and inertia on approach-and-landing performance.
The ALT project includes vehicle ground tests before the first drop
flight, preliminary flight evaluation, flying quality investigation
of the launch combination, the separation and the Shuttle subsystem
verification, and demonstration of the unpowered approach and landing.
H. OBSERVATIONS
The Shuttle program by nature of cost:. and schedule constraints
is a success-oriented program. This is exemplified by the assignment
of a single Orbiter and a single carrier aircraft to this program and
the use of the carrier for all future ferry-type operations. Major
schedule perturbation would result from mishaps or system failures
which could occur during the ALT process. 1-.te goals of the program
appear to be proper, however, and the tight planning does not at this
time imply any increase of risk to the crew during this test series,
in ferry operations or in the orbital flight tests that follow the
ALT.
93
It appears that the flight performance data and overall exper-
ience to be gained during the ALT activities as currently planned do
justify performing this series of tests. This viewpoint is based
on an assessment of the risk of performing the ALT versus the risk
in eliminating it. While the Panel believes that no single flight
test requirement for ALT would in itself justify the program, we be-
lieve that it is justified by the aggregate results.
The continuing effort of Shuttle management to utilize the ALT
project to its fullest has been a forcing function in establishing
details of the ALT. For example, the configuration of the hardware
and software is such that it will have the capability of meeting
alternate configuration options, tailcone on, tailcone off, etc.,
depending upon the results of the first few captive and free-flight
tests.
Current plans now call for five tailcone on and three tailcone off free
flights in addition to the original captive inert and inactive flights. The
use of the tailcone
and detailed analys
tailcone off as the
nificant effects of
A. Fatigue of
tests and analyses,
on the Orbiter is the result of wind tunnel tests
^s which show a high degree of 747 tail buffet with
Orbiter is being carried on top of the 74-7. Sig-
this buffeting are:
the 747 tail area P. However, based on wind tunnel
the structural capability will not be exceeded.
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B. The possibility that the mated configuration buffeting will
adversely affect flight control, as well as the 747 crew's ability
to accomplish required maneuvers.
The ALT management system was discussed in some detail with
both the NASA and contractor personnel during the fact-finding ses-
sions. It appeared that the management system, including the reviews
and information flow, has been effective in supporting the ALT pro-
ject; however, there was some indication that not all current infor-
mation had been communicated on a timely basis. The ALT CDR identi-
fied this problem and adequate steps are being taken.
III. ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. The Panel agrees that an adequate Approach and Landing Test
Project is necessary to the orderly and safe development of the
Orbiter, the ferry utilization, and other aspects of the overall
Shuttle program, both ground and flight.
B. The informatics-: gained from the ALT is important to the con-
fidence level required in making the first manned orbital flight with
the full Space Shuttle system. The value of the ALT project though,
is wholly dependent upon the results of each individual step within
the project. A willingness to alter the test program flights as
data is collected is expected, which will enhance the synergistic
results from all tests.
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C. As an aerodynamic vehicle, the Shuttle aircraft is new in
many ways. It may exhibit some characteristics in various flight
conditions that are not accurately predictable from wind tunnel or
other data. The Panel believes that the flight control system, if
provided with a cockpit gain variation, would add to the safety of
the first flight tests of the orbiter vehicle. The Panel is aware
that the ALT CDR considered this problem; however, we suggest further
review.
D. If thz orbiter L/D is to be simulated when it is flown with
tailcone on, the Panel recommends that extra caution be employed to
assure there is sufficient attitude control available when drag de-
vices are deployed. It is realized that currently such maneuvers
are not planned.
E. The profile or energy management for approach, flare and
landing are different for autoland and manual control modes. Figure 1
shows this difference. Effort is now underway to make the automatic
and manual profiles identical. The Panel believes this to be essential.
This will make it possible for the crew to follow the progress of an
automatic landing, and, if necessary, accomplish the transition from
automatic to manual with a minimum of exposure to error.
F. Lifting body flight tests show that successful unpowered
landings are best achieved following float profiles that are much
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flatter than is now planned for ALT. The Panel recommends further
review of the planning and training for the float segment of the ALT.
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9.0 EXTERNAL TANK
I. BACKGROUND
The External Tank appears to be simple in concept. The liquid
oxygen and hydrogen tanks are basically of a conventional design.
However, the Tank has turned out to have significant engineering and
manufacturing challenges. There are also the challenges of designing
the fore and aft Orbiter attachment hardware, the external insulation
and lightning protection systems. Thus a Panel member was assigned
to this important area.
Information on the status of the External Tank has been obtained
through formal presentations at JSC and Rockwell International and
through detailed review of the system at MSFC. Also, a visit was made
to Martin-Marietta at Michoud earlier. In addition, a study was made
of the Hazards Anp lysis Report, MMC-ET-RA01-A, dated October 17, 1975.
II. OBSERVATIONS
The hazard status summarized in October 1975 was:
A. 58 hazards identified.
B. 31 hazards submitted to NASA for evaluation.
C. 2 residual hazards proposed for acceptance as continuing
hazards by NASA.
D. 25 hazards resolved.
At the Quarterly Review on May 6, 1976, the list of hazards was
revised to show the following changes:
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A. 67 hazards identified.
B. 33 hazards submitted to NASA for evaluation.
C. 2 residual hazards proposed for acceptance as continuing
hazards by NASA.
D. 32 hazards resolved.
It would be premature of the Panel to comment on the detal.l de-
liberations among the contractors and the NASA Centers until firm
decisions have been reached. ]:t should be pointed out, however, that
the classification above of "Residual Hazards" corresponds to the
concept of a "Risk List" as suggested in 1975 by the Hawkins Committee
for the entire Shuttle system. The Panel concurs in the concept that
such a list should be the prime focus for reviewing the readiness for
operation of a subsystem of the Shuttle such as the External Tank and
commends the Shuttle management and Marshall for this method of moni-
toring the hazards inherent in the system.
Several hazards described in the above-referenced report should
be addressed in subsequent studies.
A. The breakdown of the hazards into the functional list selected
caused a great deal of cross referencing. Some other breakdown might
make a review by outsiders simpler and more productive.
B. The problem of flammability of the Thermal Protection System
in the presence of gaseous or liquid propellants suggests that a com-
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plete review of propellant leakage and possible spillage may be of
value. The toxicity of the polyurethane foam with a flame retardant
needs more study and a systems decision. The addition of the flame
retardant makes the residual ash and the gas emmision more objec-
tionable, perhaps unacceptable, if a fire should occur. A fire may
be avoidable and unlikely, but if one should occur, the questionable
improvement of a fire retardant makes the insulation material in use
more dangerous. The effectiveness of the retardant in case of an
oxygen leak is questionable. There is the additional fact that the
external, or banding, insulation of the External Tank is temperature
sensitive. Any lengthy exposure to direct solar heating might degrade
the integrity of the Thermal Protection System (CPR 421).
C. There was no discernable reference in the reports to previous
NASA or contractor experience on launch vehicles which must have been
subject to similar fire hazards. Solutions which were reached on such
vehicles must be equally applicable to the External Tank and would be
far more convincing to reviewers than some of the test programs or
explanations which were offered to mitigate or remove the hazard.
D. A series of lightning tests performed recently showed that
the protection system problem is not yet solved; specifically, the
bonding of multiple spray-on paint strips to a single path solid
metal in the form of the vent line. In addition, the selection of
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the proper spray-on conduction paint itself needs more test and studies.
E. The occurrence of geysering during filling of the long suction
lines has to be thoroughly tested, and the baffles inside the tank
must be protected. Tests are still forthcoming.
F. Large cryogenic separation fittings subject to water and
nitrogen icing might be troublesome to guarantee a proper disconnect.
To date, no ground separation test (even simulated) is planned.
III. ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It is the opinion of the Panel member who reviewed the External
Tank status, that there are no insurmountable risks that cannot be
adequately controlled for safe operations. It is suggested that the
Panel participate through its individual members, in subsequent critical
design or normally scheduled reviews and that the entire Panel be ex-
posed to the final "Residual Hazards" which the program managers be-
lieve should be accepted for first orbital flight and subsequent
operations.
A. The target performance data of the orbiter systems were
quot;d and finalized as a point in time when finalized loads, aero-
dynamic, thermodynamic, vibration, and vibro-acoustic, were in a pre-
liminary state. Weights and propellants have only minor allowances
for variations. Finalized date in all environmental fields will not
be available until late in the test program and may result in a costly
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redesign and, sooner or later, performance varia'ions may well result.
B. Critical mechanical activities like the complex separation
of the External Tank and Orbiter will be experienced for the first
time under environmental conditions during the first orbital flight.
If at all possible, it would be prudent to include an environmental
separation ground test in the program. A flight failure can neither
be observed nor measured and could well lead to a total loss of the
Orbiter.
C. A reasonable consistency in the quality of the External Tank
in order to achieve maximum reliability and safety of the manned flight
is best assured by continuing production. Shutdown and the subsequent
reopening of the production line will interrupt the learning curve
c.n.d compromise a reasonable, low price of the throw-away External Tank
which is best achieved by an acceptable continuous production rate.
The actual use of the External Tank is governed by entirely different
aspects. A launch delay, weather, mechanical difficulties, payload
availability, or other unpredictable events, will create a possible
storage problem for the External Tank. It would be advisable to assure
suitable limited storage space for these large External Tanks. Storage
conditions would have to be controlled to insure against degradation.
D. Lightning tests have shown some weaknesses of the test speci-
men representing the intended External Tank design. It is suggested
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that a "Lightning Protection Committee," or "Study Group," approve
the finalized lightning protection measures, not only for the launch
pad, but for the vehicle: in flight as well. These reviews should
include proper bonding and preven!'.on of static charges.
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10.0 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER
Dr. William A. Mrazek
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10.0 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER
1
I. BACKGROUND
The technology of large solid rockets is well developed, and
many operational units have been found to be reliable and trouble-free.
The Panel recognizes the importance ^f this element and the need for
high reliability. The development program on this element is now reaching
the stage for more intensive review.
Several Solid Rocket Booster Quarterly Reviews were attended and,
in addition, insight was gained by visits with the project management
staff. Up to this date, contractor visits have not been made b.-ause
of the early status of the project. The last contract for the assembly
of the booster is about to be let as of the date of this report.
Nevertheless, the latest issue of the JSC Report #09990A published
March 8, 1976, titled "Major Safety Concerns of Space Shuttle Program"
lists Lu,o open safety concerns , INTG-11 and INTG-12 9 pertaining to the
Solid. Rocket Booster.
INTG-11 - "A Nozzle Extension Separation Failure" will be dis-
posed of prior to the first launch.
INTG-12 - "Ignition Overpressure" Completion of a comprehensive
study is scheduled for July 1976. It is evident that late adverse
study results might have a considerable impact on cost, performance,
and schedule.
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II. 0BSERVATIONS
Despite the diligent application of available experience and
data, the project recognizes major uncertainties in design criteria.
Lift-off loads, thermal environment and changes will have an impact
on cost, schedule, and performance. Twelve concerns were recognized
by project management and discussed in detail. To obtain a conclusive
picture of the progress made, it was suggested by the Panel members
that at following reviews, the status of the above concerns, as well as
others, be monitored.
III. ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. The auxiliary power unit supplying oil pressure to the actu-
ators of the boosters uses as its prime mover a hydrazine-driven turbine
to operate the pumps. The exhaust stacks of all four units located in
both boosters allow the entry of sea water into the catalyst bed of the
fuel system after splashdown. To date eleven (11) mission duty cycle
tests of the unit have been completed during which the catalyst bed
was exposed to salt water for ten (10) Tiours each cycle. After retrieval
from the water, the bed was flushed out and successfully fired in all
cases. The "reconditioning" system must assure adequate flushing is
accomplished after each and every salt water exposure.
B. A molded fiber-reinfo:ced plastic cover of adequate strength could
be designed and produced to enclose the entire AP'J for protection against
sea water duncking. The savings in the long run could easily offset
the initial cost.
The Panel will be devoting increased attention to the Solid
I
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Rocket Booster system during the year ahead. Hazards associated with
Shuttle system assembly in the VAB at KSC will be included in such
surveillance.
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